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oint of View . 
By Necr/ D~•·ins 
Federal Courts Are Becoming Reluctartt 
to Ta/u.the Lead in Civil-Rights Riform 
In two recent decisions, judges have served notice they are shifting the burden to other branches of~overnment 
COURTS ARE BEGINNING tO play a less signifi· 'Cant role in civil-rights reform in higher edu-cation . In February. the Supreme Court ruled in Gm••• City Co/1•11• v. Bell that the 
prohibition in Title IX of the !Education Amendments 
of 1972 against sex discrimination extends only to the 
specific "education program or activit y" receiving fed · 
eral financial assistance. In September. a fedeml up· 
peals court suggested in Adams v. B•ll that the Depart-
ment of Education' s nondiscrimination standards are 
not subject to judicial challe~ge . Taken together. the 
two cases demonstrate an increasing reluctance on the 
part of federal courts to take the lead in civil-rights 
reform. 
In Grm·• Ciry. the Supreme Court refused to read 
systemwide coverdgc into l'atutory language that 
spoke in terms of any " prognm or activity" receiving 
ftderal money. Since the only fedeml dollars that 
Grove City College received came through its student -
aid office. the Court concluded th,at Title IX 's prohihi· 
tion a8ainst sex discrimination applied only to that of· 
fice. 
In its interpretation. the Court ignored events subse-
quent to the passage of the i972 Education Amend-
ments that ~uggested that Congn:ss was aware of the 
"systemwide" application of [Tille IX under the Ford 
and Carter Administmtions. Instead of making use 
such evidence to extend Title IX's coverdgc. the Court 
ruled that a more limited reading was necessitated hy 
the " plain language" of the stluute and the legislative 
act ivity related to its passage. This portion of the Grtll '<' 
Ciry decision follows ge.ner•lly accepted judicial pmc-
lice. since courts' slatutory Interpretations arc sup-
posed to determine CongresS' s intent at the . time it 
enacted a piece of legislation . 
The Grm·e c;,,. Court can be criticized for deciding 
this issue at all si.nce,therc was no dispute !>£tween the 
government and the col~ege on this matter. Yet. the 
Court's statutory inlerpretation was 11nrcmarkable. 
The Grort• Cily ruling. however. was the cause of great 
ire in the civil-rights community . because . unlike a host 
of earlier fedeml-court decisions broadly interpreting 
' civil-rights legislation . the Court refused to extend Ti-
tle IX cover•ge beyontl Congn:ss 's original intent. The 
Court thus left it for Congre"' either to modify or to 
leave alone the Gron• Cit \' decision. 
Adams v. B~//also demonstrates the judiciary's cur-
rent n:luctance to supply legislative judgments. In Ad-
ams, the Court of Appeals fo n the District of Columbia 
questioned-for the first time in this 14-year-old law-
suit-the ability of the NAACPILegal Defense Fund and 
others to challenge the adequ•cy of the Department of 
Education' s enforcement of civil-rights laws. The ap-
pellate court said that civil-rights groups might lack 
" standing"-that is. their claims might lack the con· 
crete ness necessary to justify judicial relief. 
Feder•l courts cannot order relief under a number.of 
circumstances. AI a minimt m. for ( Xample . adversary 
parties must exist and the plaintiff must have suffered 
an injury. The courts are supposed to insist that those 
minimum requirements be mtst: the judiciary functions 
to settle disputes. not to make fedeml policy. 
These limiting considerdtions are especially perti-
nent in lawsuits challenging lthe particular progmms 
that agencies establish to canry out their legal obliga· 
tions. In fact. the Supreme Court held in a July 191!4 
decision that "such suits. even when premised in iille-
gations of several instances of violations of law. arc 
rarely if ever appropriate for fede r•l·court adjudica-
tion ... The Court based that ruling on its bel ief that 
couns should not serve as · ·continuing monitors of the 
wisdom and soundness of Executive act ion. ·· Such su-
pervision. according to the Court . is appropriate fur 
Congress. 
The federal appeals court that heard the Adam.< case 
closely followed the Supreme Court ' s ruling and nulli -
fied a 1983 district-court order that set deadlines for the 
Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights to 
handle complaints and compliance reviews. Those 
deadlines applied to all of the civil-rights office's re· 
sponsibilities. including enforcement of Title VI of the 
1964 Civil Righls Act (prohibiting race di'\criminationl. 
Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments Cprohihit-
ing sex discrimination!. and Section 504 of the 1973 
Rehabilitation Act !prohibiting discrimination against 
the handicapped). 
The Department of Education had said that the dis-
tricl court 's requirements violated the fundamental 
principles of sepamtion of powers. usurped legitimate 
management functions belonging to the executive 
bmnch. and were unworkable and counterproductive. 
Civil-rights groups. however. felt that judicial monitor-
ing of executive functions was necessary to insure ade· 
quate enforcement of civil-rights legislation. The appel-
late court . by suggesting that the plaintiffs were with· 
out standing. did not have to address the government's 
complaint that the deadlines were unworkable and un-
constitutional. ' 
T HE APPEALS COURT that heard Adam.< was correct in its concem that courts should not serve as mechanisms "to seek a restructur-ing of the apparatus established by the Exec-
utive Bmnch to fulfill its duties ... Although the 1964 
Civil Rights Act unambiguously provides people the 
right to challenge an agency's decision to continue fi . 
nancing an allegedly discriminatory system or institu-
tion of higher education. that right should extend no 
further than challenges of a government decision af-
fecting a ·particular institution . by a person directly 
affected by the institution's allegedly discriminatory 
pmctices. Otherwise. court s become supemgencies. in 
effect running our government. 
Adams. with its 14-year history. is a prime example 
of how j udicial fiat can dominate agency prdctice . Un-
der a consent decree during the Carter Administration 
between the Department of Education and civil-rights 
plaintiffs. fedeml courts were granted authority to 
monitor the progmm components and goals of desegre· 
galion plans. Each state was required to define the 
mission of each institution in the higher-education sys-
tem: describe ill)provements to black institutions . in-
cluding the dollar aq10unt and timetable for each im-
provement : elimin~te unnecessary progmm duplica-
tion in a way consistent with strengthening the mission 
of black institutions:" give priority considemtion for 
placement of new progmms at black institutions: with· 
hold state approval of any change that might thwart 
desegregation : and establish goals for facul ty desegre-
gation and black-student enrollment in predominantly 
white institutions. 
In many respects. ·the scope of that consent decree 
made the judiciary the manager of the Department of 
Education's Office for Civil 'Rights. Although one 
could argue that without such judicial involvement the 
Department of Education might be less than vigorous 
in enforcing civil-rights laws . the real issue in Adams is 
the scope of permissible judicial authority. The appel· 
·' "' 
• 
late court 's decision in Adtmu emphasized inherent 
constitutionalli .. ilations on Judicial authority. :rhe ap-
peals court refused. as the Supreme Court had refu~ed 
in its Gro•·r C iry ruling. to create its own version of 
~ i vi l-right s laws' and of mechanisms for enforcing tl!ose 
laws. 
This trend toWard judicial restraint should not be 
equated with abdictllion by the courts of their funda· 
mental role in r:solving conflict s. Instead. as exempli-
fied in Grm·e C ry and Adum.t . it is a sign of the fed eml 
bench 's growing awareness of the limits on the judicia-
ry's role in oLr governmental scheme. In the pa• t. 
courts have been ~lling both to hear lawsuits thut. for 
varying reasons. were not the proper subjects for reso-
lut ion by fede ct~ l courts and to supply legislative judg· 
ments on vague language in legislation enacted by Con· 
gress. 
In a momenli of judicial candor. Skelly Wright . a 
fedeml appeal~-court judge . said that judges " should 
be more reluctant than we have been to fault the other 
agencies of goc•ernment and also more hesitant about 
filling the void when. in our judgment. the elected 
branches of g;,~ernment should have acted and (lti!'ed ... 
He went on tct name " one important exception: the 
area of equal rii!hts for disadvantaged mihorities. As to 
that . J remain~ uncompromising ·acti~i st' ." 
The Gm• ·~ Cir.l)"and Adcrm.t decisions cont mdict 
Judge Wright ' • assertion: in both cases lthe court ' a:· 
fused to exten•• iheir authority to provide greater pro-
tec.tion to civil-tights interests. In the Gn,..• Ciry case. 
the Supreme U>p,rt refused to supply a legt'"\fative judg· 
menton vague:Congressionallegislation. t.nhe Adem~.< 
case. a federa t.court of appeals similarly insisted tha t 
civil-rights pla:rntiffs. like other litigants. must prove 
that they have'S concrete interest in a lawsuit. 
Those court1. by recognizing the limits on judicial 
authorit)' , have shifted the focu s of civil-rights reform 
in higher educOltion to the elected branches of govern-
ment. where iulbelongs. Under the principle of sepam· 
tion ofpowers ~Jcouns .. are supposed to resolve concrete 
dispu~s. not ~>~rite laws or implement polic y. Donald 
Horowitz. a I3W prOfessor at Duke University. has 
pointed out thai the couns' necessary concentration on 
individual cases. which limits their capacity for ascer-
taining the social relevance of the facts . " unfi ts the 
courts for mucil of the important work of the govern-
ment." 
W HETH ER Congress and the executive brdnch will prove to be capable munag-<rs of civil·rights reform in higher educa-tion is an open question. The amount of 
pubiic scrutin) of Congress during its failed effort to 
respond legi s l~tively to the Gn11 •~ Ciry decision sug-
gests that the elected branches will be held accountable 
for their actio n:S Cor inaction ). Although such account-
ability does no<J guamntee that Congress and the execu-
tive bmnch wil handle civil-rights issues in higher edu· 
cation responSibly. our government was founded on 
the belief that the elected branches would . over time. 
address public-poiicy concerns in a r~sponsible man· 
ner. The Grm"f! Ci"· and Adams decisions reflect. that 
belief and rettrn thi: issue of civjliJghts lin higher edu-
cation to the oran~hes of govCMm'enl Properly con-
cerned with pdticymaking. ~ ' ....¢.. 
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